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Ask Me Another: an evaluation of issues arising from the European Values 
Survey in relation to questions concerning Technology & Transcendence. 
 
While Heidegger was asking questions concerning technology in 1949, he could not have 
foreseen the level of technological development nor the pace of change that the world has 
witnessed in the 54 years which have passed since then. Only 34 years ago, Alvin Toffler's 
Future Shock was examining the impact of up-and-coming technologies. He stated "future shock 
[is] the shattering stress and disorientation that we induce in individuals by subjecting them to 
too much change in too short a time" (1970). That sense of shock is one that is often forgotten in 
the technological debate, where the question asked is more often 'how' than 'why'.  
 
This chapter begins by looking at public opinion around the issue of technology and scientific 
advance, and correlating that opinion to other lifestyle variables such as measures of happiness 
and religiosity. It then continues to examine the impact of technology on society from a cultural 
perspective, looking at the broader issues of technological change at a social systemic level, and 
finally it considers the public opinion data in light of the systemic change issues. Overall the 
thrust of the paper is to look at some of the social implications of technology rather than 
technology in itself, specifically in relation to the new media technologies. 
 
Empirical Data 
 
We begin by looking at some empirical data about people's reactions to technology in general. 
The European Values Study is a pan-European project which utilises an omnibus survey 
focusing especially on values associated with work, religion, lifestyles and other issues. Its most 
recent data gathering exercise was in 1999/2000, the third of its kind and the first EVS to include 
former soviet-bloc countries. The previous surveys were held in 1981 and 1990. Included in the 
questionnaire in all three surveys were a number of items related to technology, simplicity of 
lifestyle and scientific advances.  
 
Table 1 shows the Irish responses to the general desirability of more emphasis on the 
development of technology over the three surveys. Generally speaking the data suggest a rise in 
the number of people seeing more emphasis on the development of technology as 'a good thing' 
(62.5% to 69.6%), a corresponding diminution in those seeing it as 'a bad thing' (15% to 9.2%), 
and a fairly static percentage of around 20% for those who 'don't mind' one way or the other. 
 
Table 1. Percentage of Respondents in Ireland  for each option in reference to 'More 
emphasis on the development of technology' 
 1981 1990 1999/2000  
A good thing 62.5% 60.9% 69.6%  
A bad thing 15% 20.2% 9.2%  
Do not mind 22.1% 18.5% 21.2%  
 
Turning to table 2, we see the corresponding percentage of responses data for the same general 
question, but this time the specific focus is on the desirability of a simple or more natural 
lifestyle. Here we see a decrease in the number of people seeing such a focus as 'a good thing' 
(87.2% down to 83.6%) and a corresponding scale of rise in the number choosing 'don't mind' as 
a response (9.9% to 14.5%). The overall variation in the numbers seeing a simple or more natural 
lifestyle as 'a bad thing is in the region of 1% over 20 years. 
 
Table 2. Percentage of Respondents in Ireland for each option in reference to 'A simple or 
more natural lifestyle' 
 1981 1990 1999/2000  
A good thing 87.2% 86.9% 83.6%  
A bad thing 2.9% 5.7% 1.9%  
Do not mind 9.9% 7.4% 14.5%  
 
Finally, in table 3 we see the responses to a question as to whether scientific advances are 
deemed helpful or harmful to mankind. Here there is little change in the numbers of people 
seeing such advances as helpful (41.1% to 39.7%) but there are significant changes in the other 
two categories. The number of people stating that scientific advances 'will harm' mankind drops 
(29.9% to 17.4%) with a corresponding rise to the more nuanced response of 'some of each' 
(29% to 42.8%). 
 
Table 3. Percentage of Respondents in Ireland for each option in response to 'In the long 
run, do you think the scientific advances we are making will help or harm mankind' 
 1981 1990 1999/2000  
Will help 41.1% 39.9% 39.7%  
Will harm 29.9% 24.7% 17.4%  
Some of each 29.0% 35.4% 42.8%  
 
If we turn to the wider constituency of the other nations included in the 1999/2000 EVS data, we 
get a broader picture. Looking first at the issue of more emphasis on the development of 
technology, we see in table 4 the aggregated responses for each nation. Generally speaking, 
nations from the former soviet-bloc countries seem to be more in favour of such an emphasis 
than those in the European Union. It is interesting to note that the Irish figures are very similar to 
those of the overall average of all nations together. Sweden, Denmark, Greece and the 
Netherlands have the levels of respondents seeing such emphasis as 'a bad thing', in excess of 
25% in each country. Sweden, N. Ireland, Spain, Germany and the Netherlands each have in 
excess of 25% 'don't mind'. 
 
Table 4. Percentage of Respondents in Europe (1999/2000 only) for each option in reference 
to 'More emphasis on the development of technology' 
  good bad don't mind 
Ukraine 89.3% 3.1% 7.5% 
Russia 88.2% 3.4% 8.5% 
Malta 87.8% 5.8% 6.4% 
Latvia 86.9% 4.0% 9.1% 
Romania 85.3% 6.1% 8.6% 
Iceland 84.5% 6.6% 8.9% 
Bulgaria 83.9% 5.0% 11.1% 
Belarus 81.6% 3.7% 14.6% 
Poland 79.6% 7.1% 13.4% 
Lithuania 79.5% 5.5% 15.0% 
Slovakia 79.0% 8.3% 12.7% 
Slovenia 79.0% 10.5% 10.5% 
Croatia 78.9% 10.8% 10.3% 
Czech Rep. 76.3% 8.4% 15.3% 
Estonia 75.4% 7.9% 16.8% 
Portugal 71.8% 9.4% 18.8% 
UK 69.2% 6.4% 24.4% 
Ireland 69.2% 9.6% 21.2% 
Italy 64.5% 13.6% 21.9% 
Luxembourg 64.1% 19.2% 16.7% 
Germany 62.0% 12.4% 25.6% 
Denmark 61.9% 26.7% 11.4% 
N. Ireland 61.3% 10.4% 28.3% 
Hungary 60.5% 20.0% 19.5% 
France 58.4% 17.7% 24.0% 
Belgium 56.8% 19.9% 23.4% 
Austria 56.0% 19.6% 24.4% 
Finland 55.3% 24.4% 20.2% 
Spain 54.8% 19.4% 25.8% 
Greece 51.9% 26.2% 21.9% 
Netherlands 48.9% 26.0% 25.1% 
Sweden 35.4% 30.5% 34.1% 
Total  69.7% 12.7% 17.6% 
 
In table 5 we see similar data for the various countries based on the response to the question 
regarding 'a simple and more natural lifestyle'. Russia stands out as the only country with less 
than 60% choosing 'a good thing' by way of response. Russia, Ukraine, Germany and the 
Netherlands all have more than 10% of respondents opting for 'a bad thing'. The numbers 
selecting 'don't mind' range from 22.1% (Russia) to 9.2% (Luxembourg). The Irish figures are 
broadly in line with the overall average, with a slight difference in the 'don't mind' category  
 
Table 5. Percentage of Respondents in Europe (1999/2000 only) for each option in reference 
to 'a simple and natural lifestyle' 
  good bad don't 
mind 
Croatia 96.9% .3% 2.8% 
Malta 96.1% 2.4% 1.5% 
Greece 94.0% 1.3% 4.7% 
France 93.1% 1.0% 5.9% 
Slovenia 91.6% 3.6% 4.9% 
Lithuania 91.4% 3.7% 4.9% 
Spain 89.8% 3.8% 6.4% 
Italy 89.0% .9% 10.2% 
Slovakia 88.0% 6.7% 5.4% 
Belgium 86.8% 2.5% 10.7% 
Estonia 86.0% 4.1% 10.0% 
Poland 85.8% 3.2% 10.9% 
Luxembourg 85.8% 5.1% 9.2% 
Hungary 84.4% 3.5% 12.1% 
Romania 84.0% 5.2% 10.8% 
Ireland 83.6% 1.9% 14.5% 
Sweden 83.4% 3.0% 13.7% 
Austria 82.5% 5.4% 12.0% 
Czech Rep. 82.4% 6.6% 11.1% 
Latvia 81.5% 6.8% 11.8% 
Denmark 81.1% 3.6% 15.3% 
Bulgaria 80.9% 6.7% 12.4% 
Portugal 80.8% 4.3% 14.9% 
Belarus 79.6% 6.9% 13.5% 
Finland 79.1% 5.1% 15.8% 
Iceland 77.9% 4.6% 17.6% 
N. Ireland 75.9% 4.6% 19.5% 
UK 74.7% 4.4% 20.9% 
Germany 69.3% 14.5% 16.2% 
Netherlands 66.4% 11.9% 21.6% 
Ukraine 65.0% 15.5% 19.5% 
Russia 59.0% 18.9% 22.1% 
Total  82.3% 5.7% 12.0% 
 
Table 6 shows similar international data for responses to the question as to whether scientific 
advances will help or harm mankind. 'Will help' ranges from 66.3% to 30.7%, 'will harm' from 
8.7% to 18.4%, and 'some of each' from 25% to 60.7%. It is interesting to note that there is a 
very strong indirect linear relationship between 'will help' and 'some of each'. Ireland once again 
is very close to the international average point. 
 
Table 6. Percentage of Respondents in Europe (1999/2000 only) for each option in response 
to 'In the long run, do you think the scientific advances we are making will help or harm 
mankind' 
  will 
help 
will 
harm 
some of 
each 
UK  40.3% 18.4% 41.3% 
Iceland 66.3% 8.7% 25.0% 
Lithuania 65.5% 6.0% 28.5% 
Belarus 55.7% 13.4% 31.0% 
Germany 49.8% 8.5% 41.7% 
Sweden 44.9% 14.3% 40.8% 
Ireland 40.7% 17.7% 41.6% 
N. Ireland 38.4% 17.7% 43.9% 
Austria 36.0% 15.7% 48.3% 
Slovenia 34.5% 10.8% 54.7% 
Croatia 33.9% 14.0% 52.1% 
Italy 30.7% 8.6% 60.7% 
Total   43.6% 12.3% 
 
Crosstabulation analyses on the variables indicated weak but statistically significant 
relationships. Reliability analyses yielded non-significant results, indicating that each of these 
variables is measuring a different phenomenon.  
 
So much for empirical data. But what exactly do these figures tell us? Essentially, the overall 
thrust of these figures is straightforward: there are considerable differences within and between 
countries on the desirability of emphases on technology and simplicity of lifestyle, and the 
overall effect of scientific advances. The picture is not by any means black-and-white. People are 
nuanced in their responses, particularly in relation to the issue of scientific advances. The 
question of the desirability of a simple and natural lifestyle is more marked across nations than it 
is within. Generally speaking, such a lifestyle is deemed desirable by a majority is every country 
but almost 20% in Russia deem that changing to such a lifestyle in the future to be 'a bad thing'.    
 
Between nations, the greatest percentage spread, 53.9%, occurs in relation to the emphasis on the 
development of technology; 89.3% in Ukraine see it as 'a good thing' compared to 35.4% in 
Sweden. On the issue of a simple and natural lifestyle, the spread is only 37.9%; 96.9% in 
Croatia see is as 'a good thing' compared to 59% in Russia. In respect of scientific advances, the 
highest spread is 35.7% but it should be borne in mind that the number of countries involved is 
significantly less; 25% of respondents in Iceland see scientific advances as both helpful and 
harmful compared to 60.7% in Italy.  
 
Happiness and Belief in God 
 
It may be useful, therefore, to turn again to the EVS data, in a view to looking at some further 
data on a wider number of phenomena.  As indicated in the opening of this chapter, the EVS 
contains many variables related to lifestyle and religion amongst other things. If we look at the 
responses to the question about happiness, we see the data in table 8. It is important to bear in 
mind that the lower the mean score, the higher the level of happiness. Here we see that there is a 
distinct break between eastern and western nations in Europe, with the western nations indicating 
higher levels of mean happiness that the eastern nations.  
 
Table 7 Mean Levels of Happiness from the EVS data by country  
(1=very happy, 4=Not at all happy) 
Country Mean N Std. Dev. 
Iceland 1.56 965 .56 
Netherlands 1.60 1002 .60 
Denmark 1.61 1017 .60 
N.Ireland 1.61 984 .63 
Ireland 1.62 1008 .58 
Belgium 1.69 1894 .68 
Sweden 1.71 1012 .63 
Luxembourg 1.72 1201 .59 
Austria 1.74 1507 .65 
France 1.76 1607 .62 
Malta 1.85 1002 .70 
Finland 1.86 1032 .60 
Spain 1.94 1172 .59 
Portugal 2.00 995 .61 
Germany 2.03 1995 .67 
Italy 2.05 1975 .69 
Czech Rep. 2.05 1900 .54 
Croatia 2.06 992 .61 
Greece 2.09 1098 .72 
Slovenia 2.09 979 .66 
Poland 2.15 1075 .72 
Hungary 2.16 991 .78 
Lithuania 2.21 809 .56 
Slovakia 2.26 1304 .67 
Estonia 2.29 964 .65 
Belarus 2.31 903 .65 
Latvia 2.39 986 .68 
Bulgaria 2.56 978 .81 
Russia 2.57 2431 .76 
Ukraine 2.57 1145 .75 
Romania 2.61 1127 .74 
Total 2.03 38050 .73 
 
 
Running a one-way ANOVA on mean happiness with the attitudes to technology as factors 
yields a significant result (F=55.27, p<.001). The descriptive data are given along with the 
Bonferroni data in table 8. The data indicate that those who see an emphasis on development of 
technology as good are least happy and those who see such development as bad are the most 
happy. 
 
 
Table 8 Analysis of variances data from Attitudes to Technology by mean level of 
(un)happiness  
 
Descriptives 
happiness  
  N Mean 
      
good 24815 2.04 
bad 4599 1.93 
don’t 
mind 
6207 1.98 
Total 35621 2.02 
 
   
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: happiness  
Bonferroni  
    Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Sig. 
(I) more 
emphasis 
on 
technology 
(J) more 
emphasis on 
technology 
    
good bad .11* .000 
  don’t mind 6.45E-02* .000 
bad good -.11* .000 
  don’t mind -4.53E-
02* 
.004 
don’t mind good -6.45E-
02* 
.000 
  bad 4.53E-02* .004 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
A similar one-way ANOVA test on mean happiness with the attitudes to a simple and natural 
lifestyle as factors also yields a significant result (F=29.34, p<.001). The descriptive data are 
given along with the Bonferroni data in table 9. The data indicate that those who see an emphasis 
on a simple and natural lifestyle  as ‘good’ or ‘don’t mind’ are happier than those who see such 
an emphasis as ‘bad’. 
 
 Table 9 Analysis of variances data from Attitudes to Simple & Natural Lifestyle by mean 
level of (un)happiness  
 
Descriptives 
happiness  
  N Mean 
      
good 29497 2.00 
Multiple Comparisons :Dependent Variable: 
happiness  
Bonferroni  
    Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Sig. 
bad 2044 2.13 
don’t 
mind 
4217 2.00 
Total 35758 2.01 
 
(I) towards 
natural 
lifestyle 
(J) towards 
natural 
lifestyle 
    
good bad -.13* .000 
  don’t mind 3.40E-04 1.000 
bad good .13* .000 
  don’t mind .13* .000 
don’t mind good -3.40E-04 1.000 
  bad -.13* .000 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
A further one-way ANOVA test on mean happiness with the attitudes to scientific advances as 
factors also yields a significant result (F=13.10, p<.001). The descriptive data are given along 
with the Bonferroni data in table 10. The data indicate all three groups are different on the 
happiness scale, those who see scientific advances as helpful the happiest, and those who see 
scientific advances as simultaneously harmful and helpful as the unhappiest. 
 
Table 10 Analysis of variances data from Attitudes to Scientific Advances by mean level of 
(un)happiness  
 Descriptives 
happiness  
  N Mean 
      
will 
help 
5475 1.87 
will 
harm 
1487 1.92 
some of 
each 
5524 1.94 
Total 12486 1.91 
 
 
.Multiple Comparisons: Dependent Variable: 
happiness  
Bonferroni  
    Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Sig. 
(I) scientific 
advances 
help 
mankind 
(J) scientific 
advances 
help 
mankind 
    
will help will harm -5.16E-
02* 
.027 
  some of 
each 
-6.47E-
02* 
.000 
will harm will help 5.16E-02* .027 
  some of 
each 
-1.30E-
02* 
1.000 
some of 
each 
will help 6.47E-02* .000 
  will harm 1.30E-02* 1.000 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
Running the same set of tests on mean responses to the ‘importance of God in one’s life’ yields 
some interesting results. The outcome for an ANOVA on importance of God with attitudes to 
emphasis on the development of technology was non-significant, i.e. there were no statistically 
significant differences between the groups. Running ANOVA for importance of God with 
attitudes to simple and natural lifestyle (F=259, p.<000) and scientific advances (F=32.66, 
p.<000) yields the results seen in tables 13 and 14. Those with the highest mean sense of God as 
important in their lives see a simple and natural lifestyle as ‘good’ and scientific advances as 
‘harmful’, whereas those with the lowest mean sense of God as important in their lives ‘don’t 
mind’ about a simple and natural lifestyle but believe that scientific advances will ‘help 
mankind’. 
 
Table 11 Analysis of variances data from Attitudes to Natural & Simple Lifestyle by mean 
importance of God in Life 
 
Descriptives 
Importance of God in life  
  N Mean 
      
Good 30100 6.10 
Bad 2069 5.20 
don’t 
mind 
4352 5.05 
Total 36521 5.92 
 
Multiple Comparisons: Dependent Variable: 
importance of God in life  
Bonferroni  
    Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Sig. 
(I) towards 
natural 
lifestyle 
(J) towards 
natural 
lifestyle 
    
good Bad .90* .000 
  don’t mind 1.06* .000 
bad Good -.90* .000 
  don’t mind .15 .225 
don’t mind Good -1.06* .000 
  Bad -.15 .225 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
 
Table 12 Analysis of variances data from Attitudes to Scientific Advances by mean 
importance of God in Life 
 
Descriptives 
Importance of God in life  
  N Mean 
      
will help 5854 5.83 
will harm 1667 6.40 
some of 
each 
5901 6.22 
Total 13422 6.07 
 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: importance of God in life  
Bonferroni  
    Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Sig. 
(I) scientific 
advances 
help 
mankind 
(J) scientific 
advances 
help 
mankind 
    
will help will harm -.56* .000 
  some of each -.39* .000 
will harm will help .56* .000 
  some of each .17 .148 
some of 
each 
will help .39* .000 
  will harm -.17 .148 
*  The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
These various analyses of variance are simply a statistical way of looking at groups – in our case 
groups determined on the basis of their attitudes to technology, simplicity of lifestyle, and 
scientific advances – and seeing where they stand in relation to other variables such as happiness, 
and importance of God in their lives. While it is important not to derive simplistic conclusions 
from the statistical analyses, it is clear that the broad trends indicate significant differences 
between the groupings on the variables measured. But these trends mask underlying 
complexities. Further analysis, outside of the scope of this chapter, should usefully focus on 
gender and age, as well as individual countries and varying GNP.  
 
The impact of technology 
 
Survey questions, however, are a blunt tool at best for examining such critical topics in society, 
especially where there is such a variation in responses. To suggest that the various attitudes to 
technology can effectively be garnered along three axes – good, bad and don’t mind – may be 
utilitarian and economic but it does little to advance a deeper understanding of the underlying 
systemic issues. To focus on partial specifics can result in a failure to direct attention to critical 
dimensions of the whole. 
 
Neil Postman argues this well in his critique of technology in contemporary society , 
Technopoly. He points out that  
technological change is neither additive nor subtractive. It is ecological … One 
significant change generates total change. If you remove the caterpillars from a 
given habitat, you are not left with the same environment minus caterpillars: you 
have a new environment and you have reconstituted the conditions of survival … 
(1993, p. 18). 
 
New technologies have had considerable impact on social and cultural life. The influence of 
printing, the discovery and application of electricity, the development of mass transport, the 
invention of birth control drugs, the patenting of gene technologies, and the implementation of 
new media in society all have profound and far-reaching effects. When new technologies are 
implemented, they take time before they are fully adopted, but at the outset, the impact of 
adoption is not fully realised. It is only when a technology is fully embedded in society that its 
impact begins to become clearer, but by then there is no mechanism for getting the genie back 
into the bottle. As Postman puts it  
New technologies alter the structure of our interests, the things we think about 
(Postman’s emphasis). They alter the character off our symbols: the things we 
think with. And they alter the nature of community: the arena in which thoughts 
develop (1993, p. 20). 
 
Postman certainly has a case to make, and his book is a well crafted response to the issue of 
technological domination in society today. But he overstates the case. The same problem arises 
with Bernard Cohen’s famous comment on the mass media, that while they may not be 
successful in telling of what to think, but they are stunningly successful in telling us what to 
think about (Cohen, 1969). This is the agenda setting hypothesis that enjoys high currency in 
communications studies courses and one that does have strong empirical support.  It does, 
however, suffer from the same flaw as Postman’s ‘technopoly’ hypothesis in that it fails to take 
the end user into account.  
 
The Role of Common Sense 
 
We wring our hands, for example, at the crass excesses of the tabloid newspapers, but we also 
know that most readers are well capable of reading between the lines and are not as gullible as 
many would have us believe. People tend to exercise common sense about issues in their lives 
and are not simply slaves to cultural change. This is in direct contradiction to the kind of image 
presented to us by cult films like The Matrix and its sequels. The same is true of issues and 
concerns related to technological uptake. Most parents, for example, are concerned about the 
amount of time their children spent in front of television rather than studying their schoolbooks 
or engaging in sport and seek to limit the one in favour of the others.  
 
We need to recognise the difference between hype and substance, especially in terms of selective 
media reporting on aspects of technology. The frenzied reportage about the dangers of the 
internet to children fails to take into account the role of adult supervision and the inherent 
unlikelihood of stumbling across child pornography. Interestingly enough, we do not experience 
the same frenzy about children being killed on our roads, or children dying of malnutrition across 
the world, or children being exiled to permanent poverty because of inequalities in education, 
although the numbers involved in these latter three categories vastly outweigh the number of 
children in danger from the internet. Most people, thankfully, have the wisdom and experience to 
make such distinctions and are active users rather than passive recipients. 
 
Nonetheless, despite these reservations about Postman’s emphasis he does have a valid point to 
make. Technology is all pervasive and ongoing, scientific advances continue to open new 
Pandora’s boxes on a regular basis, and the possibility of retreating to a more natural and simple 
lifestyle is increasingly remote, except paradoxically for those who can afford to do it, often with 
the assistance of the latest technological wizardry. His central thesis is that we are collectively 
unaware of what is happening. Elsewhere in this volume readers will have encountered the 
apocryphal story of the villagers being guided in a new venture by a philosopher, an engineer 
and a scientist. Who or what shall be our guide? Postman’s argument is essentially about the 
blind leading the blind, all caught up in a technological euphoria that does not allow for the 
drawing of breath nor pausing for thought.  
 
It is precisely this failure to think critically about the issues raised by technological change that 
constitutes his primary cause for concern. Todd Gitlin, writing on the power of media in the 21st 
century, puts it succinctly 
I propose that we stop – and imagine the whole phenomenon freshly, taking the 
media seriously, not as a cornucopia of wondrous gadgets or a collection of social 
problems, but as a central condition of an entire way of life. Perhaps if we step 
away from the ripples of the moment, the week or the season, and contemplate the 
torrent in its entirety, we will know what we want to do about besides change 
channels (2002, p.210). 
 
This concern is shared by theorists like Paul Virilio, who argues for an apocalypse-termination 
following a journey along a chronological axis as the inevitable outcome of technological 
development (1997). Part of Virilio’s thesis is that any new technology is always self-poisoned at 
its inception, containing inevitably the seed and source of its own destruction, such as 
development of dynamite leading to the bomb or of the train to the train crash; there cannot be 
one without the other.  Similarly, critical theorist Helena Sheehan comes to the conclusion that 
‘our technology has outstripped our wisdom’ (1987, p. 66) in the context of television content 
being driven by technological capability rather than a desire to communicate or tell a story. 
These are in stark contrast to earlier theorists like Marshall McLuhan (1964) who saw only the 
positive benefits to be provided by new communications media in developing a global village. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What we face here, then, is a deeply polarised view of technology, one which sees it as a 
destructive anti-social force which is inevitably damaging, and the other that sees technology as 
essentially benign, a boon to the world despite whatever the collateral damage along the way 
might be. Both are ultimately fatalistic, accepting that technology and its concomitant forces of 
ongoing change are here to stay, and we can do little to alter that.  
 
The EVS data, on the other hand, do not support such theses at first glance. If the forces of 
technology are as irresistibly powerful as some seem to think, the evidence for a single common 
mindset about technological development and scientific advancement across Europe does not 
exist. Opinions about technology and science would appear to be quite varied and never 
monolithic. While there are modest associations between levels of happiness and religiosity with 
attitudes to science and technology, the modest nature of such associations, taken in tandem with 
the size of the dataset under consideration, does not allow us to draw neat conclusions about a 
relationship between the one and the other. 
 
In reality, people will continue to adopt new technologies and they will also adapt to the effects 
of emerging technologies in society. Most theorists fail utterly to take audiences and end users 
into account. Despite the nay-sayers, from the Luddites onward, history shows us that society 
continues to grow and thrive. The real challenge to us in the face of new and emerging 
technologies is one that has been with us since the dawn of time: how can we, in fact, make this 
world a better place to live for all the people of the planet? The real risk to us  is not technology; 
it is, rather, the possibility that some would allow themselves to so cocooned and insulated from 
reality that they would not see the plight of those on the other side. The Dives and Lazarus of our 
time are separated by more than fine linen and good food.  
 
The greatest challenge to society today is simply to think. Many of our endeavours are geared 
towards various ends, sometimes with little reflection. We can readily behave like lemmings, 
following on the example of others for no reason other than the behaviour of the other. 
Habermas’s public sphere (1962, 1991, 1996), arguing for constructive open debate about the 
core issues by all the members of society, remains something of a dream. Technological comfort 
can breed ignorance as to the plight of how the other half actually lives. Despite the shrinking of 
our world by means of technology, we have forged a whole series of individual little worlds, 
rather than a single open communicating world of equals, a globe of villages rather than a global 
village. Insofar as technology directs us towards an unthinking acceptance of the status quo, 
society must be both vigilant and resistant.  
 
An unthinking acceptance of technological change and development (and equally an unthinking 
rejection of such change and development) does not necessarily move us along as a society. 
Rather than being beguiled by the detail of the smaller picture we need, individually and 
collectively, to look at the larger canvas. As people we need to dream the dream of what society 
can be, not in terms of its technological perfection, but in terms of human freedom and 
fulfilment. Insofar as technology brings us toward that end, it should be embraced. Insofar as it 
does it does not, we need to ensure that our embrace of technology is not such as would exclude 
us from pursuing the core goals of freedom and possibility. 
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